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RESEARCH AND EVALUATION
The Western Australian Regional Forest Agreement:




This article explores the constraints imposed by economic rationalism on environmental
policy-making in light of Western Australia’s (WA) Regional Forest Agreement (RFA) experi-
ence. Data derived from interviews with WA RFA stakeholders shed light on their perceptions
of the RFA process and its outcomes. The extent to which the involvement of science and
the public was enabled by RFA management is analysed. The findings point to a perva-
sive constrainedness of WA’s RFA due to a closing of the process by the administrative
decision-making structures. A dominant economic rationality is seen to have normalised and
legitimised political closure, effectively excluding rationalities dissenting from an implicit
economic orthodoxy. This article argues for the explication of invisible, economic constraints
affecting environmental policy and for the public-cum-political negotiation of the points of
closure within political processes.
Key words: economic rationalism, regional forest agreements, stakeholder opinions
Over the last 25 years, the rise of economic
rationalism has changed the nature and work-
ings of Australia’s political and administra-
tive structures. These changes paved the way
for a new approach to public policy based on
a newfound appreciation for economic (neo)-
liberalism which promised a freer economy,
more openness and less government interven-
tion. Australia’s wholesale adaptation of this
new rationality and its effects are well docu-
mented and debated (eg, Pusey 1991; Carroll
and Manne 1992; King and Lloyd 1993; Rees,
Rodley and Stilwell 1993; Bell 1997; Beeson
and Firth 1998; Orchard 1998; Pusey 2003).
Unsurprisingly, environmental policy-
making in Australia has also been subjected
to the influence of the burgeoning economic
credo. While the growing application of the
economic paradigm is welcomed and defended
by many commentators and seen as a step
towards more efficient decision-making for
environmental protection (Hahn 2000), others
warn about its ‘over-dominance’ (Aplin 2000)
and highlight its shortcomings when applied
to complex, socio-ecological realities (eg,
Eckersley 2001; Dovers 2002). In particular,
critics fear that the reductionist, economic
rationality is ill-equipped to deal with messy
political problems, especially those concerned
with social and environmental issues, because
of its perceived ontological and epistemologi-
cal narrowness (Dryzek 1996; Hamilton 2002;
Fergus and Rowney 2005).
The author of this article also adopts a more
cautious view of the stronghold of economic ra-
tionalism within the public policy arena. This
article focuses in this context on the prob-
lems arising out of the dominant position of
economic rationalism in environmental policy
processes that claim to respect the democratic
imperative of pluralism and the environmental
imperative of sustainability. For this purpose,
this article will concentrate on the native forest
debate in Western Australia (WA) in the late
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1990s. During this time, the political attempt
was made to implement the National Forest
Policy Statement (NFPS) (Commonwealth of
Australia 1992) in WA through a Regional
Forest Agreement (RFA) process. A case study
is presented, offering insights into RFA stake-
holders’ perceptions of WA’s RFA process and
the outcomes it achieved. Attention will be fo-
cused on the input by science and the general
public into the formulation of guidelines for
future forest use and management. The case
study findings inform a broader discussion
about the impact of economic rationalism on
environmental policy-making and the openness
of political processes per se. It will be argued
that, in the case of WA’s RFA, economic ratio-
nalism was responsible for the political closing
of the RFA process, leading to the marginali-
sation of alternative rationalities and the even-
tual public rejection of the RFA process and its
outcomes.
Economic Rationalism and the
Environment
Economic rationalism can broadly be under-
stood as a worldview based on ideas derived
from neoclassical economic theory (Edwards
2002; Wright 2003), which ‘accepts and ad-
vocates the primacy of the markets’ (Valentine
1996:3). Within neoclassical economics nature
is perceived as separate from and subordinate
to the human economy. Based on a highly re-
ductionist subject-object dualism nature is seen
mechanistically as the mere provider of re-
sources and services needed to satisfy human
demand (Diesendorf and Hamilton 1997; Gare
2002). The substitution of even critical natural
resources is deemed permissible, and associ-
ated negative environmental effects are either
not accounted for or become a matter of ade-
quate pricing (Daly and Cobb 1989).
Human-nature conceptions such as these are
in stark contrast to more holistic, open-system
perspectives developed for the management
of complex social and environmental systems
within fields such as ecology or ecosystem
health (eg, Rapport et al. 1998; Gunderson
and Holling 2002). Unsurprisingly conflict is
pre-programmed between ecologists and neo-
classical economists, for instance, on issues
such as biodiversity protection or land man-
agement. Tensions such as these might be re-
garded as healthy within pluralistic societies.
Yet, a single economic rationality frequently
dominates over other rationalities in public and
political discourses (Handmer, Dovers and Nor-
ton 2001) based on asserted scientific objectiv-
ity and truth and the denial of any influence
of bias (Nevile 1997; van Bavel and Gaskell
2004). The purported apoliticality and neutral-
ity of economic rationalism means that val-
ues and assumptions remain hidden (Hamil-
ton 1996; Meppem and Gill 1998) and that
a façade of objectivity and truth can be used
to legitimise policy prescriptions and discredit
and reject dissenting (ir)-rationalities (Pember-
ton 1988; Hamilton 2002).
There is agreement in the literature that socio-
ecological problems are complex and trans-
scientific (Kinzig 2001; Ludwig 2001), re-
quiring collective learning approaches (Stacey
1993) and integrative solutions based on holis-
tic decision-making processes (Mitroff 1998).
Complexity within the policy arena often leads
to the stagnation of policy processes, necessitat-
ing some form of trimming or closure. As illus-
trated in van Straalen and Souren’s (2002) ex-
ample of the life-cycle of science-policy com-
munication (see Figure 1): growing levels of
complexity are shown to lead to greater turbu-
lence and management problems and ultimately
to the stagnation of the policy process. A trim-
ming of complexity is thus required for the sake
of practicality, implying that closure can be re-
garded a ‘natural’ phenomenon in political pro-
cesses. Yet, the trimming of such processes also
harbours risks. In particular, policy processes
which are dominated by a bounded (Kasper
1997) or blinkered (Daly and Cobb 1989) eco-
nomic rationality are prone to dismiss the value
of different perspectives and to be insensitive
to socio-ecological complexities, compounded
further by the rationality’s seeming invisibility
in political and public discourses.
Many commentators consider economic ra-
tionalism and its underlying neoclassical eco-
nomic theory as today’s socially dominant
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Figure 1 The Need for Closure (Trimming) in the face of Complexity
paradigm (eg, Schafer 1994; Korhonen 2002).
This dominance has led to the widespread mar-
ketisation (after Dovers 2002) of politics, nature
and society in Australia. This process served to
‘normalise’ (after Foucault 1979) an economic
rationality which became the ultimate commen-
surability principle, resulting in other rational-
ities remaining subordinate (Handmer, Dovers
and Norton 2001). It is suggested here that eco-
nomic rationalism has become socially and po-
litically engraved and thus a largely invisible,
‘political rationality’ (after Beeson and Firth
1998), the implications of which are illustrated
further below in the WA RFA case study.
Background to Western Australia’s
Regional Forest Agreement
Australia has experienced a long-running dis-
pute over native forest use and management
(Dargavel 1998), which resulted from a clash
between forest conservation and production
agendas since the late 1960s. The forest con-
flict in Western Australia mirrored the acerbic
forest debate at the national level. At the heart
of the conflict were calls by conservationists
for the reduction of the rate of commercial tim-
ber extraction, the cessation of woodchipping
of native forests and an end to the practice of
old growth forest logging. The timber indus-
try, in contrast, was calling for greater resource
security and employment protection (Stewart
and Jones 2003).
A particular conflict surrounded WA’s nature
conservation agency known as CALM (Depart-
ment of Conservation and Land Management),
which had been the centre of a hostile debate
since its inception in 1985. The department
stood accused of a conflict of interest because
it was in charge of both forest conservation and
forest production, being revenue dependent on
timber royalties and thus seen as pro-industry.
In addition, CALM’s forest management prac-
tices, its public relations, and perceived
philosophical position towards forestry were
criticised by members of the public, conserva-
tionists and scientists. Disquiet arose, in partic-
ular, over what was seen to be a very aggressive
defence by CALM of its silvicultural practices
based on ‘irrefutable in-house’ science, being
dismissive of alternative perspectives.
In the early 1990s, when the national forest
debate reached its zenith, the National Forest
Policy Statement (Commonwealth of Australia
1992) was introduced, promising an end to the
national stalemate. The NFPS spoke of conflict
resolution and certainty for all stakeholders via
improved forest reserve systems, industry com-
petitiveness and ecologically sustainable forest
management practices. Regional Forest Agree-
ments were the intended vehicles for the oper-
ationalisation of the NFPS, aiming to deliver
a balance between timber interests and conser-
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vation demands. They represented individual,
20-year-long agreements entered into by the
Commonwealth and States and Territory gov-
ernments, which sought to regulate native forest
use, conservation and management.
RFAs were purported to be inclusive and
accessible (Commonwealth of Australia 1992;
Commonwealth of Australia and Government
of Western Australia 1996), and it was stressed
that effective community involvement was re-
garded as critical for both the successful com-
pletion of RFAs and the durability of their
outcomes. In addition, RFAs were hailed as
‘agreements backed by science, science and
more science’ (Commonwealth of Australia
2000:9) and were promoted as having been
based on the most detailed and comprehensive
scientific assessments ever made in Australia
(Commonwealth of Australia and Government
of Western Australia 1997).
Comprehensive Regional Assessments
(CRAs) formed the scientific basis of RFAs,
bringing together new and existing information
about the natural, cultural, economic and social
values of forested areas (Coakes 1998). In WA,
more than 500 high calibre scientists and ex-
perts were reported to have been involved in the
RFA process, providing input via workshops
and expert panels as well as CRA projects (WA
Parliamentary Debates – Hansard June 1999).
In terms of community involvement, the public
was consulted through a wide range of mecha-
nisms, including RFA-related research reports
and information kits, an information line, a
video and newsletters, fortnightly RFA updates
published in the state’s daily newspaper as well
as local papers and a RFA internet website. In
addition, three consultative reference groups
were formed, community heritage workshops
and public meetings were convened, and
surveys and interviews were conducted as part
of the RFA’s social assessment component
(see Social Assessment Unit 1999).1
Despite these mechanisms, both the scientific
and participative nature of WA’s RFA process
was criticised widely by various RFA stake-
holder groups. Stakeholders, especially sci-
entists and conservation groups, felt that the
RFA document neither reflected best science
nor the wishes of the community and that
overall decision-makers were ignorant of a
wide range of views on forest use and manage-
ment. In response to immense public pressure
generated by conservation groups and Western
Australian celebrities (eg, music, fashion, liter-
ature) the Court Coalition government repudi-
ated the original RFA only eight weeks after the
agreement had been signed. In the face of con-
tinued public agitation surrounding the RFA the
Court Coalition government lost the state elec-
tion in early 2001 partially because of the public
reaction to the RFA and the Labor opposition’s
promise to put an end to old growth logging in
WA.
In summary, the forest debate in WA had not
been resolved, seemingly because of a failure
to provide a process and deliver outcomes that
were credible scientifically and acceptable to
the broad spectrum of RFA stakeholders. In this
context, the case study will explore the notion
of process failure in the light of stakeholders’
perceptions of underlying process constraints
that led to the closure of the RFA process. It
will be shown that the RFA’s lack of credibility
and acceptability was linked to the closure of
the RFA process to rationalities dissenting from
the dominant, economic perspective held at the
RFA management level.
Method
This article is based on a case study-based in-
vestigation into the Western Australian RFA
(Brueckner 2004). Over a three-year period
from 1999 to 2001, 59 interviews were con-
ducted with participants selected via snowball
sampling (see Babbie 1992). The group of par-
ticipants included state and federal politicians
and public servants, RFA process managers,
conservationists and timber workers as well as
forest industry representatives, scientists and
members of the general public (see Table 1).
The interview data were analysed following
a discourse-analytical approach developed by
Butteriss, Wolfenden and Goodridge (2001) as
a means of unearthing plural perspectives held
within natural resource disputes. This approach
is aligned with the perspective of dialogic dis-
course (Deetz 1996), inclusive in nature and
suited to capture a plurality of perspectives,
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Table 1. Participant Groupings
Participant Group No. of Participants Participant Details
Government/Departments/ 19 13 employees of government departments
Political Parties 6 State/Federal politicians
Scientific Community 12 12 scientists
Timber Industry/Industry 9 4 timber mill owners/managers
Groups/Unions 4 timber worker/industry representatives
1 softwood plantation owner
Stakeholder Reference 8 3 local council members
Group/General Public 1 Noongar community spokesperson
1 apiary industry representative
1 tourism industry representative
2 members of the general public
Environment Groups/Conservationists 11 10 NGO members
1 forest protester
Total 59
Note: participant groupings do not imply intra-group homogeneity
rationalities and subjectivities. The use of vi-
sual coding and analytic deduction served to
identify discursive themes and patterns, which
were developed by way of ‘partitioning’ the
interview data into what are called ‘rhetor-
ical landscapes’ (Butteriss, Wolfenden and
Goodridge 2001). Data partitions were subject
to further questioning and analysis in conjunc-
tion with RFA-related data derived from the lit-
erature and media content.
The data presented below are a digest of
themes pertaining to the issue of exclusion in
connection with the public’s ability to partici-
pate and the involvement of science in the RFA
process. The different perspectives of the RFA
are presented as a coherent meta-narrative, a
synthesis of individual accounts of this policy
process. Selected quotes from interview tran-
scripts are shown in inverted commas. How-
ever, due to confidentiality constraints individ-
ual stakeholders must remain anonymous.
Stakeholders’ Perceptions of Western
Australia’s Regional Forest Agreement
In terms of its participatory nature, WA’s RFA
was purported to be inclusive and to be based on
community input (for a detailed discussion see
Brueckner et al. 2006). Stakeholders’ percep-
tions of the inclusiveness of the process, how-
ever, were in stark contrast to the way in which
the RFA was being portrayed by RFA manage-
ment.
While the RFA process was widely seen as
generally accessible, the level or quality of
access proved to be contentious. Essentially
anyone – as a member of a registered organ-
isation – could be signed up with the Stake-
holder Reference Group (SRG)2, and individu-
als were free to attend public meetings. Thus,
RFA management maintained that ‘there were
public meetings . . . open to anybody to attend’
and that ‘everybody [got] a fair go’. In contrast,
community members and conservation groups,
however, saw the SRG as irrelevant to the pro-
cess for it was perceived to be a ‘Mickey Mouse
Committee of everybody from the prospectors
to anyone who was nominated.’ Even members
of the timber industry felt that the SRG ‘was
never going to be the actual place where major
decisions [would be] made.’ In addition, con-
servation groups who sought access to the RFA
steering committee believed that RFA manage-
ment ‘formed the Steering Committee and left
conservationists out of it’, resulting in their boy-
cott of the RFA process.
Public meetings were also seen by partici-
pants to have been conducted poorly in that
‘meetings were called . . . at too short a notice’
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and were more like ‘a briefing session by
CALM’ or a ‘lecture by CALM’ and that they
‘had no input whatsoever.’ SRG members inter-
viewed ‘felt insulted by this process’, which in
their view ‘demonstrated an incredible level of
indifference towards community involvement
and community participation and community
concerns.’ This led to the perception among
SRG members and members of the public that
they ‘did not have ownership of [the process]’
as it ‘was very obvious [to them] that [their]
concerns were going to be sidelined.’
The public’s access to RFA-related informa-
tion was also controversial. RFA management
suggested that the ‘information that had been
provided to the public, both the assessment in-
formation and all the other information [was]
much greater than you would have in most other
government processes.’ SRG members as well
as members of the public, however, thought that
they ‘did not get proper access to information’
as ‘the documentation was nowhere available
until the last moment’ and that the data pro-
vided were ‘fudged and massaged.’ These per-
ceptions were fuelled further by suspicions that
information was kept from the public for strate-
gic reasons based on the attitude that ‘knowl-
edge is power or information is power . . . [and
that we] will keep it to ourselves and use it
maybe in agreed ways but it’s never going to be
in the public domain.’ According to one CALM
insider, ‘there was a guiding fear that if there
are good quality data and they are in the pub-
lic domain then the nature of the debate would
change enormously.’
Across the stakeholder community there was
a strong sense that ‘CALM drove that pro-
cess’ and that the agency ‘had no intention of
letting other people be involved.’ In particu-
lar, CALM’s perceived dominance gave rise
to the view that the RFA process was effec-
tively ignoring the environment movement and
the wider community. While RFA management
considered there to have been a ‘huge amount
of public consultation’ and to have done its
‘best to adapt that consultation to what people
were saying they wanted it to be’, SRG mem-
bers, conservation groups and members of the
public ‘rebelled against this because they [felt
that they] were not part of the decision-making
process’, resulting in a ‘vote of no confidence
in the RFA process’.
Stakeholder perceptions of the treatment of
science (for a detailed discussion see Brueck-
ner and Horwitz 2005) during the RFA process
mirrored those concerning the consultation pro-
cess. Science was purported to be the backbone
of WA’s RFA and to replace emotional argu-
ments with facts. Yet, despite these assertions,
many RFA stakeholders, scientists and conser-
vation groups in particular, criticised the sci-
ence of the RFA.
Scientists involved with the CRA work com-
mented that ‘not enough time was given’ to
compile the CRA reports because of an ‘appar-
ent rush and pressure on to get it all over and
done with’, which was seen to have ‘actually
constrain[ed] the process.’ The same scientists
also expressed unease about both the availabil-
ity and adequacy of the data that were meant to
underpin the RFA. With regards to data avail-
ability, there was a general feeling among non-
CALM scientists that ‘information . . .was very,
very tightly controlled . . . and limited’. ‘Much
of the data came from existing information held
by [CALM]’, yet some non-CALM scientists
suspected that a ‘lot of data sets . . . were not
[made] available’ to them, others stated cate-
gorically that ‘there were quite a few databases,
or sets of data . . . that were not available.’
With regards to the adequacy of the data,
it was suggested that many of the ‘data sets
that were available [were] totally inappropri-
ate [for modelling purposes]’. This is why the
same scientists believed that ‘there needed be
data collected, not just data compiled’. How-
ever, ‘there was no scope to go and acquire
additional data which were [thought to have
been] fundamentally required’ for any flora and
fauna modelling. Consequently, non-CALM
scientists considered ‘the outcomes . . . [as]
quite flawed’ and scientific conclusions as ‘ex-
tremely suspect in the sense that they . . . [were]
based on inadequate data’ and neither ‘. . . on a
fair and comprehensive assessment of the entire
forest region nor . . . on any assessment of ma-
jor conservation requirements throughout the
forest region’. To one CALM staff member the
limited scoping of research projects was quite
deliberate and based on the attitude that: ‘We
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don’t want a particular sort of information, we
don’t want good data sets on this, we don’t
want to know’, which explains why CALM
stood accused of a blinkered approach to forest
management.
In terms of data review and integration non-
CALM scientists expressed considerable mis-
givings about how the ‘reports were dealt with
and how they were incorporated into the pro-
cess.’ Scientists involved in the CRA projects
suggested ‘that there ha[d] been an inadequate
review process, that all . . . reports went through
some sort of haphazard review, an unclear pro-
cess of incorporating the material found within
them, [and] a very stifled publication process in
which the reports were made public’. The same
scientists raised concerns that ‘the people who
were actually in control were not scientists’ and
‘had no knowledge’. It was felt that public ser-
vants aligned with the ideology of RFA man-
agement, ‘took facts or what they thought were
facts and figures, out of the reports’ but never
‘told . . . [the scientists] how . . . [the] reports
[were] going to be dealt with.’ In the end, a
number of scientists found that . . . [the] recom-
mendations that were in . . . [their research] re-
ports were not included in the summary’, which
was used to inform the community consultation
process. Thus, in their view ‘the coverage [of
different scientific views] was inadequate’ be-
cause ‘certain scientific views that ha[d] been
expressed about the ecology of [WA’s] forests
. . . did not find their way into any of the RFA
documentation.’ The structure and the process
of the RFA seemingly proved resilient towards
views and information running counter to the
dominant perspective.
Overall, the RFA process was considered to
be ‘very, very much dominated by CALM staff’
and an ideology which had permeated many
public sector departments since the early 1970s.
CALM’s involvement in the RFA was deemed
problematic because the department ‘received
. . . the lion’s share in terms of involvement of
scientists’ which was not considered ‘an accu-
rate representation of the amount of science that
[was] . . . going on in [WA’s] forests.’ It was this
‘very substantial CALM input into the RFA’
that caused non-CALM scientists, conserva-
tion groups as well as state and federal civil
servants to be concerned that ‘CALM [would
be] . . . absolutely and completely in control of
the process.’
The dominance of CALM and its ideol-
ogy was visible particularly in debates on old
growth forest logging, which was among the
most contentious issues underlying the long-
standing conflict in WA’s forests. Old growth
forests were recognised in the NFPS (Common-
wealth of Australia 1992: 11) for their ‘high
aesthetic’ and ‘cultural’ values as well as their
‘nature conservation values.’ Yet, calls for the
protection of old growth forests during the RFA
faced the resistance of CALM, which – as was
suggested by a federal civil servant – ‘fun-
damentally did not believe in a special value
pertaining to old growth.’ Indeed, CALM staff
confirmed that ‘there is nothing particular about
[Western Australian] old growth forests which
is absolutely indispensable for biodiversity
conservation.’
During the RFA process 347,578 ha of old
growth forest were identified, yet a total of
24,300 ha of old growth were excluded on the
basis of disturbance, especially dieback disease
(phytophthora cinnamomi) (WA Parliamentary
Debates – Hansard April 1998). This deci-
sion was seen to have come about because of
CALM’s stance on old growth forests. The De-
partment ‘appeared to have used phytophthora
mapping strategically to determine the areas
that were not old growth.’ Conservation groups,
in particular, were convinced that ‘[CALM] re-
ally did fiddle the figures’ and saw the for-
mula: ‘old growth is virgin forest minus dieback
affected forest’ as a way of ‘. . . allow[ing]
them to minimise the area of old growth.’ An-
tagonism also grew when RFA maps revealed
that forests with the ‘highest timber production
areas . . . [seemed to] coincide with the areas
that . . . [were] not protected’ (see also Burns
1999). Even though the finalised RFA delivered
an additional 45 700 ha to WA’s old growth
estate, a 24% increase (WA Parliamentary
Debates – Hansard 1999), there was a strong
sense among RFA stakeholders that ‘any-
one who did not agree with the continued,
widespread logging, woodchipping, and clear-
felling of old growth forest was marginalised’
by the RFA.
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In the end, the science of the RFA was tainted
as people from across the RFA stakeholder
community felt that ‘the involvement of the sci-
entific community was an absolute farce’ in that
‘science and scientists were used to validate
a political process.’ Interview responses gave
the impression that the science of the WA RFA
was tamed, meaning that dissent was ignored
or vehemently rebutted and that science was
made compliant with the dominant ideology.
This imposition of a single perspective instilled
the widespread feeling that ‘science was used
as a weapon.’ According to one non-CALM
scientist science was used to build a façade,
a ‘façade . . . the process would be using sci-
ence to provide [Western Australians] with . . .
answers . . . whereas in reality, the guidance,
the levels of forest reservation and so on, was
coming from elsewhere, and it was not com-
ing from science.’ It was this blurring of sci-
ence and politics that, according to a Western
Australian parliamentarian, led stakeholders to
believe that the ‘RFA process ha[d] not been
about science’ and ‘overall that the scientific
arguments were rather unimportant.’
Discussion
The RFA stakeholder sentiments collated above
give an indication of the strong sense of exclu-
sion from the RFA process and lack of owner-
ship of the outcomes achieved. A lack of trans-
parency and information sharing, restrictive
communication flows and stakeholders’ dis-
connectedness from the decision-making pro-
cess were seen to have been responsible not
only for stakeholder dissatisfaction with the
RFA process but also the disparity between the
process outcomes and stakeholder aspirations.
Similarly, the scientific input into the RFA was
regarded as constrained by the imposed for-
mat under which the science was conducted.
Contrastingly, RFA management thought to
have more than fulfilled government regula-
tions regarding community input and viewed
the science underpinning the RFA as the best
available.
Overall, RFA stakeholder involvement was
believed to have been constricted by decisions
concerning, inter alia, process management and
leadership, stakeholder consultation and the use
of science. These decisions represented points
of closure which led to the separation of the
process from the wider RFA stakeholder com-
munity. Although process closure occurred, this
was denied by those at the heart of the closing,
which in turn proved to be a source of conflict.
In addition, conflict arose in relation to the is-
sues of where, when and by whom closure was
initiated.
The closure of the RFA process was a matter
of autocratic decision-making, undertaken by
those at the top of the decision-making hierar-
chy and most closely aligned to the political,
scientific and economic status quo. The clos-
ing of the process meant that those stakehold-
ers who were calling for change in the use and
management of WA’s native forests faced ex-
clusion in terms of input during both the public
consultation process and the scientific work un-
dertaken for the RFA. The closedness of both
the process and its governing structures meant
that the RFA outcomes were seen as very nar-
row and a mere reflection of CALM’s position
on forest management.
The traditional, dominant perspective on
forests in WA was one based on a scientific
endorsement of the commercial extraction of
native timbers. This link between forest science
and economic interest, however, is not to be un-
derstood as departmental cooption by industry
but instead as a sign of ideological alignment.
Forestry is an applied natural science, positivis-
tic in nature with a strong adherence to mea-
surable and quantifiable evidence. Claims by
forestry to objectivity and truth translate into
scientific determinism and result in the discred-
itation of any ‘counter-sciences’ (after Paehlke
1989), a stance typical of economic rational-
ism. Also, as forestry sees its role in the main-
tenance of perpetual human forest uses it has
also become a symbol of human development
and economic progress. In this sense, scientific
forest management bears the hallmarks of eco-
nomic rationalism.
The failure of WA’s RFA in terms of gain-
ing public acceptance strikes as a rejection by
RFA stakeholders of the deterministic nature of
the process, which seemingly served to validate
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CALM’s agenda on forestry. This agenda was
implicit in the RFA process which originally in-
tended to aid the negotiation of sustainable for-
est outcomes in terms of timber production and
forest conservation. A closing of the process,
however, served to protect the Department’s ap-
proach to forestry and meant that other rational-
ities remained subordinate to the dominant per-
spective. Forest issues were raised, framed, and
solved in accordance to an underlying, yet un-
spoken, but strongly adhered to, economically
driven forest rationality. This is what might
be coined ‘the normalisation of political clo-
sure’, referring here to the closing of a politi-
cal process by an implicit economic constraint,
affecting both the process and structure of
policy-making. CALM’s ideology on forestry
represented this meta-constraint for it pre-
vented, not directly but through normalised
social and political structures and discourses,
the broadening and inclusion of alternative
perspectives.
The interplay of economic rationalism, re-
ductionist science and politics prevented a joint
exploration of shared values among stakehold-
ers and the development of a compromise be-
tween the agendas for forest conservation and
timber extraction. Complex problems demand
problem solving with requisite complexity. In
this regard, political processes require open-
ness as this invites the variety of perspec-
tives needed and thus increases the capacity to
deal effectively with socio-ecological messes.
The dominance of economic rationalism can
thus be seen as a constraint for environmental
policy-making for it works against notions of
openness and plurality and therefore precludes
trans-formational change in the structure, mode
and outcomes of political decision-making.
Due to its invisibility a better understanding is
needed of the implicit existence of constraints
arising from economic rationalism and a criti-
cal reflection on their effects on and their long-
term implications for policy, society and indeed
nature.
Echoing the calls from the contemporary lit-
erature, it is suggested here that policy pro-
cesses such as this presented in the RFA
case study would benefit greatly from ap-
proaches based on open and collectively
engaged decision-making and a widening of the
basis of power. The opening of traditional clo-
sure points (eg, leadership and problem speci-
fication) would enable processes of collective
deliberations through which negotiated points
of closure become the basis for action along
agreed process parameters. Also, the pooling of
mental resources would lead to a substantially
broader collective outlook on the problems
faced by the negotiating parties. Yet, changes to
this effect depend chiefly on the willingness of
decision-makers to relinquish power and to en-
gage in open dialogue with their constituencies.
This is why current political/bureaucratic struc-
tures derived from politico-economic and sci-
entific entanglements, which promote today’s
neo-liberal growth agenda and orthodox eco-
nomic credo, appear to be one of the key obsta-
cles to be overcome for the enablement of such
deliberative processes.
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Endnotes
1. For a detailed description of the WA RFA
process refer to Stewart and Jones (2003) or
Worth (2004).
2. The terms of reference for the SRG stipu-
lated a close working relationship between the
SRG and the RFA steering committee and a
strong involvement of the SRG with the RFA
process.
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